

SECRET

Executive Secretary

82-6003

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

DDI 177-82
8 January 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting of [] 6 January

1. [] met on 6 January to coordinate a paper analyzing potential Soviet reactions to the range of military options produced by the JCS should a Libyan sponsored terrorist or similar event against the United States occur. The paper is to be considered [] on 11 January. Helene Boatner, D/NESA, and the undersigned attended.

2. The essential conclusion of the group, which is incorporated into the final version of the paper, is the following:

"We judge that the Soviets are extremely unlikely to use their forces in such a way that a military confrontation with the US would develop. If, however, the US is slow or hesitates to use force, the Soviets might judge that we could be deterred by greater Soviet force presence. After a US attack, the Soviets are extremely likely to seek and Libya is likely to grant increased Soviet military access and presence."

3. Although not an intelligence community production per se, this study was responsibly undertaken and conflicting views taken into account. What this means is that two systematic studies impacting on the current Libyan considerations have been made: the SNIE entitled "Libya: Impact of Economic Sanctions"; and this study entitled "Soviet Role in a US-Libya Confrontation." It may be that a third study focusing more sharply on regional Middle Eastern and Western European reactions to the range of prospective US actions would be useful.

This Memo is classified
SECRET in its entirety.